The Enemy State Clauses in the UN Charter: Their Status and Their Removal

Pyracantha After its delicate white flowers fade, the pyracantha produces an abundance of bright red berries. Its ever-changing beauty throughout the year makes it impossible to take my eyes off it.

 According to an Asahi Shimbun article dated September 28, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi stated in her address to the UN General Assembly general debate on the 22nd: "The enemy state clauses should be deleted as soon as possible. I say this emphatically, on the pride and honor of Japan, which has contributed greatly to the work of the United Nations over the past 70 years."

Yuta Ogi of the Asahi Shimbun wrote the piece with a tone of concern, suggesting that the Prime Minister’s remarks could be weaponized by China to criticize Japan for a "new militarism."

Let me begin by looking at how the Charter of the United Nations came into being. I will then briefly summarize the "enemy state clauses" and their current status, before examining Japan’s present situation and an illusion that many Japanese people may still harbor.

The Birth of the UN Charter and Its Shadow

The name "United Nations" was coined by U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt during the Second World War. It was first used in the Declaration by United Nations on January 1, 1942, in which government representatives from 26 countries pledged to fight together against the Axis powers (primarily Germany, Italy, and Japan).

Following deliberations held in Washington, D.C., in 1944 by representatives of China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, delegates from 50 countries attended the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco in 1945. Firmly resolved to end "the scourge of war," they drafted the Charter of the United Nations and signed it on June 26, 1945.

Poland had not been invited to the San Francisco Conference, but it signed the Charter later, on October 15, 1945, bringing the total number of original member states to 51. Today, the UN boasts 193 member states. The Charter officially came into force on October 24 of that same year. (The reason why Poland signed later is quite fascinating, so you may want to look it up online!)

The United Nations was formally established after the Charter was ratified by China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and a majority of other signatories, with its headquarters established in New York.

Crucially, the Charter and the organization itself were created by the victorious powers of World War II. This reality is directly reflected in the composition of the permanent members of the Security Council—the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union (now Russia), France, and China—each of which holds veto power and thus wields immense influence over the organization.

The Enemy State Clauses and International Perceptions

The enemy state clauses in the UN Charter primarily refer to Articles 53 and 107. Their content and subsequent history can be summarized as follows:

• Article 53 (Regional Arrangements): Normally, when a regional security organization like NATO takes military action against another state, authorization from the UN Security Council is required. However, an exception was established for cases in which a former enemy state of World War II attempted to resume an aggressive policy: military action could be taken directly without Security Council authorization.
  
  
• Article 107 (Actions Concerning Enemy States): This stipulates that measures taken or authorized by the Allied powers (the victors) against enemy states during or immediately after WWII cannot be invalidated or precluded by the provisions of the UN Charter.

While the Charter does not explicitly name the "enemy states," they correspond to the former Axis powers: Japan, Germany, Italy, and others.

However, since the war, these former Axis powers have contributed profoundly to the international community as major pillars of the UN, and these clauses have never actually been invoked. Today, the universally accepted consensus among international law scholars and governments is that these provisions hold no practical legal effect. In short, they are obsolete—regarded by the global community as dead letters.

Two major steps have been taken toward formally removing these clauses via UN General Assembly resolutions:

• General Assembly Resolution 50/52 (1995): This resolution recognized that the enemy state provisions were "obsolete." It was adopted by an overwhelming majority—155 votes in favor, none against, and three abstentions (with China voting in favor). Member states agreed to work toward their eventual removal.
  
  
• UN World Summit (2005): At this summit, heads of state and government adopted by consensus a formal commitment to remove all references to "enemy states" from the UN Charter.

In other words, at the General Assembly level, a broad agreement to excise these provisions has already been reached, backed by all permanent members of the Security Council.

Why Have They Still Not Been Removed?

For an amendment to the UN Charter to enter into force, it must be ratified by two-thirds or more of all UN member states, as well as by all permanent members of the Security Council.

This makes the amendment process exceptionally difficult. Individual governments are rarely entirely monolithic; a national leader agreeing to something at the General Assembly does not automatically guarantee that their domestic government will follow through with ratification.

Complicating matters further, a fateful decision was made in 2005. Because amending the UN Charter demands an enormous expenditure of political energy, Japan, Germany, Brazil, and India (the G4) attempted to pursue comprehensive reform by bundling the removal of the enemy state clauses with another long-standing objective: expanding the permanent membership of the Security Council.

Brazil claimed a seat as the representative of South America, while India demanded status commensurate with its rising global power. Japan and Germany, naturally, sought permanent seats as well. The four nations believed that a joint, cross-regional campaign would be far more effective than individual bids.

Ultimately, however, this strategy triggered intense conflicts of interest with neighboring countries and African states. With no realistic prospect of securing the necessary two-thirds majority, the draft was scrapped without even coming to a vote.

Furthermore, securing the unanimous approval of all permanent members proved insurmountable for Japan and Germany. A recent case in point: during the September 2026 session of the UN General Assembly, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov voiced firm opposition to Japan and Germany securing permanent seats, accusing them of supporting Ukraine and promoting militarization. At the same time, he expressed support for India and Brazil, appearing to deliberately sow division among the G4 coalition.

While mainstream international perception views the enemy state clauses as dead, China and Russia have occasionally dropped hints about them to pressure or intimidate Japan.

The Illusion Japan Must Shed

Many people likely believe that the best way for Japan to win the understanding and support of the international community is to fully support and utilize the United Nations.

That sounds entirely sensible, and one might argue there is no other realistic path forward.

However, even if Japan wins global understanding and support, it achieves very little if it lacks true leverage—the "power to make things happen."

Because every permanent member holds a veto, if even one opposes a draft resolution, it dies instantly. To truly change the system, Japan needs the hard-headed diplomatic and strategic weight required to compel the permanent members to take notice and agree.

Until Japan develops this kind of tangible power, it risks remaining trapped in illusions about what the UN can do for it.